Data centres can no longer treat ransomware as just an IT problem

Lorri Jansen-Anessi
Lorri Jansen-Anessi
VP of Global Risk Operations at BlueVoyant

Lorri Janssen-Anessi, VP of Global Risk Operations at BlueVoyant, explains why modern cyber threats demand a broader resilience strategy.

As data centres become more critical than ever to national infrastructure, they are increasingly exposed to ransomware groups seeking to disrupt operations. At the same time, a more volatile geopolitical landscape amplifies this threat, with rising tensions between nation-states fuelling opportunistic cybercrime and the targeting of digital assets, networks and facility systems.

The weakness in traditional security models

The key drawback of traditional security models is that they are designed to tackle isolated incidents and focus on perimeter-based defence, rather than the persistent, evolving ransomware activity that data centre operators currently face.

Historically, cybersecurity and incident response were treated as isolated IT functions, primarily focused on containment and recovery after an event. Today’s threat landscape requires a fundamentally different approach to deal with attacks that are increasing in frequency and AI-driven sophistication.

With nation-state actors exploiting systemic weaknesses at scale, such as unpatched vulnerabilities, weak identity controls, exposed remote access pathways and fragmented supply chain oversight, traditional siloed security models are increasingly challenged by cross-domain ransomware attacks. This is especially true in data centre environments, where IT and operational technology (OT) systems increasingly converge, creating additional attack paths if security controls are not consistently applied across both domains.

Ransomware attacks have evolved beyond encryption

Ransomware attacks no longer necessarily rely on traditional encryption methods. With today’s advanced technology, threat actors are developing ‘encryption-less extortion’ tactics, focusing solely on data exfiltration and the threat of leaking or selling stolen sensitive information.

Often used as part of double- and even triple-extortion strategies, these tactics reflect a fragmented, competitive and increasingly strategic threat landscape, with attackers employing different approaches and focusing on high-value targets, including operators of critical digital infrastructure such as data centres and cloud hosting environments.

AI is accelerating this shift, enabling attackers to increase the speed, scale and sophistication of attacks. It also allows nation-state threat actors to automate reconnaissance, credential theft and large-scale extortion campaigns. This is part of a growing trend of ransomware attacks deployed primarily for political retaliation and reputational damage, rather than financial gain.

Modern ransomware campaigns are now deliberate, intelligence-driven and aligned with strategic outcomes. This underscores a critical ongoing shift: ransomware is no longer just a criminal tool; it is an instrument of geopolitical disruption.

The rise of state-sponsored attacks

The distinction between criminal ransomware groups and state-sponsored actors has become increasingly blurred, as their tactics, infrastructure and operational outcomes begin to overlap. State-sponsored actors and hacktivist groups may use similar methods to those employed by financially motivated attackers.

Nation-states rely on proxy networks and criminal ecosystems. This hybrid model obscures attribution and enables them to maintain plausible deniability, blurring the lines between ‘traditional’ cybercrime and state-backed attacks.

Simultaneously, financially motivated actors are adopting tactics, infrastructure and operational discipline once associated primarily with advanced state-sponsored campaigns.

As a result, cyber operations now sit in a grey zone where ransomware campaigns may be enabled, supported or strategically aligned with geopolitical objectives. For data centre operators and infrastructure teams, this means threats can originate from a diverse range of actors but have similar disruptive outcomes, impacting service availability, customer trust and operational continuity.

The convergence of state-backed and financially motivated threats creates a more unstable and difficult environment for those defending data centre infrastructure. Attribution is harder and responses become more complex, with data centre operators caught in the middle of broader geopolitical tensions.

Increased supply chain and infrastructure risk

The risks posed by nation-states are amplified in critical infrastructure environments. Ransomware and ransomware-style attacks can have a catastrophic impact on healthcare, public utilities and emergency services, as well as the data centres that underpin these sectors, where disruption directly impacts safety and continuity.

Geopolitical actors are actively targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) and OT environments, exploiting supply chain weaknesses through multifaceted, persistent attacks. In data centre environments, this can include attacks targeting building management systems, cooling infrastructure, power management platforms, physical access control and other operational technology that supports facility uptime.

Compromise of these systems can move a cyber incident beyond data loss or IT disruption, creating direct consequences for service availability and safe facility operations. Attackers understand this scale advantage and are targeting third-party ecosystems rather than individual enterprises.

Data centre owners should secure privileged access to facility and OT systems, restrict third-party remote access, maintain segmentation between IT and operational networks and ensure critical services can continue operating safely during a cyber incident.

The need for increased visibility

The challenge for many data centre decision-makers is that visibility often stops at direct suppliers, while the real risk exists deeper within fourth- and fifth-party relationships. To address this, they must maintain accurate registers of critical suppliers and map data flows and dependencies across all tiers.

For data centre operators, this includes understanding dependencies across hardware vendors, managed service providers, connectivity partners, identity providers and facility-management technology suppliers. Visibility alone is not enough.

Operators should identify concentration risk and single points of failure across the ecosystem. Multiple critical services may ultimately depend on the same technology provider, connectivity partner, identity platform or downstream supplier, creating systemic exposure that may not be apparent when vendors are assessed individually.

Third-party risk management should move beyond assessing whether a supplier is secure in isolation and examine:

  • The operational dependency it creates;
  • The access it holds;
  • The third-party providers it relies on;
  • The consequences if that supplier is unavailable or compromised.

The importance of preparation, accountability and true resilience

Addressing modern ransomware risk requires a shift from reactive defence to business-wide resilience. This means embedding cybersecurity into core business decision-making, ensuring that cyber resilience is built into every operational area, not just the IT or security teams.

Infrastructure teams must therefore adopt a cross-functional approach, involving legal, communications, HR, facilities and critical third-party vendors.

At the same time, leadership accountability must increase, with boards and executives needing a clearer understanding of cyber risk and accountability sitting at the highest level. Cyber risk is a business resilience issue, not just a technical one.

Ultimately, effective cyber defence depends on resilience across the organisation. The combination of geopolitical tension, proxy activity and destructive tooling means data centre operators must assume disruption is a realistic scenario. Hardening identity controls, securing remote access pathways, segmenting networks and protecting backup systems are absolutely essential.

Data centre operators and digital infrastructure providers need to integrate cybersecurity, physical infrastructure security, supplier governance and operational resilience into a unified risk management strategy. The measure of preparedness should not solely be whether controls exist, but whether the organisation can continue delivering critical services when those controls, systems or dependencies are placed under real-world pressure.

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